Indri Hapsari Susilowati
API Fellow 2004 - 2005
Abstract
The rate of train accidents in Indonesia is fairly high. 85% accidents were caused by human error. Human error can occur when the train driver is doing his job. One of the causes is the ergonomic factor. More ergonomics of the driver cabs will reduce the rate of accident during the work. Unsafe condition is still the main reason in railway accident in Indonesia, therefore preventive action is still focused on improvement of equipments and facilities. Meanwhile, in Japan Railways that problem has been left for 25 years.
There are some protective devices which not develop in Indonesia Railway. Nowadays, Japanese scientists are researching about unsafe act done by driver and eliminating the risk comes from unpredictable condition. They make a good selection system to choose the driver and has a minimum standard of requirement for both physically and mentally to become a train driver.
I. INTRODUCTIONS
Train is one of the main alternative public transportations in Indonesia that will easy people to travel from one place to another in Java. They tend to choose this transportation for it is safer, more relax, faster, and the price of the ticket is still affordable.
Various services and new products provided by PT Kereta Api Indonesia (PT KAI) nowadays have increased a positive image among the people, which is necessary to be maintained and improved. One way to implement this purpose is to give more attention to a safe journey. Commuters’ safety and comfort should be put on the top priority.
Similar with other transportation traffics, accidents sometimes occur as well on the railway. However, the number of train accidents is fewer although the amount of the victims is greater. Furthermore, the damage caused by a train accident costs a lot more expensive than accident happens on the street, for instance. Besides that, one train accident usually causes a delay of the train schedule. Of course, this condition is disadvantages to its commuters. These reasons could be the answers why train accidents always get a national attention and apprehension.
The rate of train accidents in Indonesia is fairly high. In 1996 106 accidents happened, 196 cases in 1999 (Suara Merdeka, December 27 2001), while in January – August 2001 there were 7 dreadful accidents, which took 109 people injured and 65 died. During 2002, there were 217 accident, but accident between train and another train decreased 6 accidents (Kompas, December 20, 2002). 85% accidents were caused by human error, the caused of railway condition is 7%, the condition of train is 5%, and the environmental or bad climate is 3% (Suara Merdeka, December 27, 2001). Human error can occur when the train driver is doing his job. One of the causes is the ergonomic factor. More ergonomics the room of the driver cabs will reduce the rate of accident during the work.
Therefore, the research to analyze further about the main cause of human error particularly that usually happens to train driver still rarely in Indonesia. The research will take The Japanese Railway as the bench marking. This country is chosen for its excellent railway system. In addition, the measure of citizen anthropometrics in Japan is similar with Indonesia.
II. SET OF PROBLEMS
To maintain the positive image as a chosen public transportation, PT KAI should enhance its services, precise the train schedule, and guarantee a safe and comfortable condition for the commuters.
It is important for PT KAI to give serious attention on ergonomics aspect, mainly on driver workstation, in order to enhance their services. This is because the condition of the train during the way is under the responsibility of the train driver. Therefore, a comfortable and safe work environment is very significant for these workers.
III. OBJECTIVES
Getting safety risk on driver workstation of The Indonesia Railway.
Getting information about safety implementation on The Japanese Railway
Getting information about the comparison between The Indonesia Railway and The Japanese Railway
IV. METHODOLOGIES
Sample
Indonesian Trains that will be taken as samples are all classes inter province trains altogether with the train engineers.
Tools
Camera, video camera, carpenter meter, arc, check list, lux meter, WBGT, sound level meter, questioner, and check list.
Method
1. Worksite Analysis
Worksite analysis will be carried out by performing direct survey based on walk through checklist. Train engineers will be given questioners to recognize symptoms or signs they suffer during working.
2. Measurement
Measurement will be accomplished by measuring noise, temperature, illumination, seat design, position, shape, and colors of control and display in the train engineer cabin. Working postures and repetitive motion will also be measured to the train engineers.
3. Collecting Secondary Data
Secondary data that will be collected are medical records, outputs of the previous measurement, and other supported data.
V. THE RESULTS
The Indonesia Railway
1. The workers
In Indonesia Railway divided into 3 classes, there are economic class, business class, and executive class. Train type of economic class and business class operate by 2 persons, 1 person is the driver, and another one is the assistant of driver. Meanwhile, the executive class operates by both of the drivers. In Depo Jatinegara where I took the data, the total number of the drivers is 70 persons and the assistant driver is 50 persons. To become drivers of train, the candidates should follow education and training for drivers of train in Yogyakarta City for 3,5 months. Then, they are required to study in their Depo for a year. After graduate, they can not be drivers directly but have to be assistant driver’s first minimum for a year.
Figure 1: The percentages of complains among the workers
Every time the drivers of train begin to work, each of them will have medical check by a medical doctor to assure their condition is ready to work. From the questioner, the drivers were older than the assistant. They were in their productive age i.e. 27 – 52 years old and had been working for 3 years until more than 10 years. Most of the workers complained about stiffness, pain and rigid on their legs; especially on the calf; neck, and low back.
Figure 2: the part of body which suffer among the workers
The symptoms primary appeared after working, and when woke up in the morning. However, they considered it was all light since the symptoms usually disappeared after they got rest. Some respondents overcame the symptoms by drinking medicinal herbs and taking traditional massage. These sighs usually occurred because of sitting postures and push the pedal for a long time.
The workers suggested the management to fix the condition of driver cabs for more safe, comfort, and secure. To illustrate, the condition of windows, wipers, and doors were broken, its can not work appropriately. The seat also not in good condition, the width was too narrow.
2. Working Postures
Picture 1: Condition of the driver’s cab
The workers were doing the jobs on the sitting position. The results of observation by OWAS Method, which back was straight and bent forward, arms was both arms are below shoulder level, legs was sitting, and no load. Generally the work posture included in action category 1: no corrective measures and category 2: corrective measures in the near future. Otherwise, the driver cab was a narrow of room. It could make limitation of movement among the workers. Sometime, the workers twisted their waist and raised their one of hand. If it was happened, the work posture is bad posture and included in action category 3: corrective measure as soon as possible.
3. Environmental
The measurement of environmental factors in the driver cabs, consisting temperature, illumination, noise, and vibration. Except vibration, the other parameters were primary data which collecting by direct measurement. The driver cabs in Indonesia Railway divided into 2 types. There are locomotive CC 201 for economic class and locomotive CC 203 for executive and business class.
Picture 1: Locomotive CC 201
Picture 2: Locomotive CC 203
- Temperature
The data of temperature at locomotive CC 201 was 28, 1 – 28,9o C, with the average was 28,7 o C. While, the data at locomotive CC 203 was 27, 0 – 30,2 o C, with the average was 28,6 o C.
Reference standard used is NIOSH, where working temperature suggested is 260 C. However, the Indonesian Government Regulation concerning about working environment as stated in Decree of Minister of Health of The Indonesian Republic No: 261/MENKES/SK/11/1998 about Requirements of Working Environment Health, states that the temperature for a health industrial environment is 21 – 300 C. If the results gained are compared with NIOSH, both locomotive CC 201 and CC 203 exceed 1 – 40C higher from the suggested standard. On the contrary, if the results are compared with Indonesian Regulation, they are still below the standard. This is because Indonesia is a tropical country in which the average of the global temperature is + 300C in the afternoon. When measurement was taken during operation, the workers didn’t seem to be bothered by the temperature as the temperature in the working site was almost similar with the global temperature. In other words, the workers were used to it.
- Illumination
The Decree of Minister of Health of The Indonesian Republic No: 261/MENKES/SK/11/1998 about Requirements of Working Environment Health states that lighting for continuous jobs is 200 lux.
The measurement conducted in the morning until afternoon, where can get the sun shine directly. Because of that, all the results of measurement is over than 200 lux, approximately 700 – 1900 lux. But if the measurement conducted in the night, the results will be decrease.
- Noise
Table1. The Results of noise measurement at the driver cabs
Condition Locomotive CC 201 Locomotive CC 203
The speed of 60 km 80,6 dBA 74,3 dBA
The speed of 90 km 83,9 dBA 83,1 dBA
The speed of 120 km - 88,1 dBA
Bell 99 dBA 94,2 dBA
Whistle 109 dBA 89,2 dBA
Passing through another train 86 dBA 87,5 dBA
Take brake 88 dBA 84,9 dBA
Stop 66 dBA 69,4 dBA
Passing through the cross 89 dBA 86,1 dBA
Passing through the bridge or the tunnel 92,1 dBA 91,9 dBA
Based on The Decree of Minister of Public Health of The Indonesian Republic No: 261/MENKES/SK/11/1998 about Requirements of Working Environment Health, noise standard for 8-hours-working in industrial environment is 85 dBA
The results that were over than the reference when rang the bell, a whistle, pass through the cross, the bridge, and the tunnel. Locomotive CC 201 never run in the speed of 120 km/h, but when it takes the brake, there was noisier than locomotive CC 203. The above condition happened on the short time and not continuously, so that the workers still can tolerate. Instead of, when the locomotive CC 203 run in the speed of 120 km/h, the noise was 88,1 dBA. This condition should be anticipated because it could happen in the long time. There was needed noise absorber because it could impact the hearing loss among the workers.
- Vibration
There is no direct measurement but there is secondary data of the results measurement in 2003. It was the measurement of vibration on hand arms, collected to 6 workers. The result was lower than the reference of Kepmenaker no. 51.MEN/1999.
The Japanese Railway
Cases of accident in Japanese Railway
In Japan there were accident cases too but since 1990 there were only 4 cases. The first, it happened on 14 May 1991, between Kibukawa and Shigaraki near Kyoto, collision on Shigaraki Kogen Railway (SKR) and JR West special train from Osaka. On that day, Shigaraki was crowded with people visiting “The World Ceramic Festival”. At 10:14, a four car DMU train was about to start from Shigaraki for Kibukawa but the duty stationmaster could not turn the departure signal to be green. The control panel showed another train approaching train, but he could not understand the situation, because he knew there was no approaching train. The next arrival was a JR West special train from Osaka but it should still have been at Kibukawa Station. He consulted SKR’s operation manager and a signaling engineer, but they could not turn the signal into green either. Finally, the operations manager decided to left the train go by non – blocking operation and got into the cab with an extra driver to act as pilot. The SKR train left Shigaraki 11 minutes late with the signal still showing red in defiance of the duty stationmaster’s opinion.
The JR West special train from Osaka left Kibukawa Station at 10:18. The two train were scheduled to pass at Onodani, the intermediate signal station. When the JR West train arrived at Onodani at 10:30, the SKR train was not there and the departure signal showed green, allowing the JR West train to proceed. The JR West driver passed Onodani, believing that the SKR train was still at Shigaraki or some reason. As he rounded a sharp curve, he found the SKR train coming head on. The two trains collided at 10:35, 42 people died and more than 600 people were injured (Suga, 2002).
The second, it happened on 8 March 2000, when a southbound Hibiya Line eight – car EMU owned by Teito Rapid Transit Authority (TRTA, a Tokyo metro operator) was approaching Naka Meguro Station at 12 to 13 km/h, the two axles of the front bogie of the last car suddenly derailed. A trackside lead rail installed for setting off track maintenance vehicles caused the derailed 8th car to slew further right, hitting the 5th and 6th cars of a northbound eight car EMU (owned by Tobu Railway). That accident caused 5 passengers died and 63 others injured. The derailment of the southbound train occurred at a difficult location on a transition curve after a sharp curve with a radius of 160 m and a steeply rising grade at 35 per mill. The track gauge is 1067 mm and there was no anti derailment guardrail (Suga, 2002).
The third, it happened on October, 23, 2004, in Niigata Prefecture, Joetsu Shinkansen Line, 8 of its cars went off the tracks because of earthquakes. It was the first bullet train to derail in the Shinkansen’s 40 years history since its operations. There were no one injured. The Shinkansen’s main anti-quake measure is called UrEDA (Urgent Earthquake Detection and Alert System. With seismometers planted every 20 kilometers along Shinkansen lines, the high-tech devices immediately detect the fast – reaching weaker primary wave (P – wave) of an earthquake and shut off the train’s power in less than 3 seconds. The idea is that the Shinkansen will stop or be traveling at a safer, slower speed when the stronger secondary wave (S – wave) arrives and the ground begins to violently shake. But quake experts had warned that the system would be ineffective for temblors occurring close to the Earth’s surface, it will be explained more on the below, the protective device’s section. The Joetsu Shinkansen system detected the P – wave and cut off power. But the S – wave arrived at almost the same time because the focus, or underground center of the quake, was so shallow and the train was near the epicenter (The Asahi Shimbun, November 11, 2004)
The last accident happened in Amagasaki, Hyogo prefecture on April, 25, 2005. There were 107 people died and more than 500 people injured. While the impact of the accident on the company’s earning, JR West, is uncertain. It has lost 1.4 billion to 1.6 billion yen due to a two month suspension of services on the line, Senior Managing Director of JR West said. The speeding commuter train jumped the tracks around a major curve and smashed into an apartment building during the morning rush hour (Kyodo News, June 23, 2005). Analysis of a monitoring device in the fifth carriage has proven that the train was traveling at about 62 mph as it entered the curve even though the speed limit was 43 mph. Several seconds later, the driver slammed on the brakes. If brakes are applied when a train is traveling on a curve, it generates a centrifuge force toward the outside of the curve and sharply increases friction between the flanges of the wheels on the outside and the rails, which could cause the wheels to float up (Science daily, June 30, 2005).
Japan National Railway
Japan National Railway had restructuring on 1987. Japan National Railway had privatization and divided into 6 Japan Railways (JR’s). There are JR East, JR Central, JR West, JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, and JR Kyushu. There are other companies under Japan National Railway, such as Railway Communications Company, Railway Information System Company, and Railway Technical Research Institute.
Railway Technical Research Institute (RTRI) establish in December 1986. RTRI is the corporation which inherited the testing and research work of the Japan National Railways in 1987. Prior to that, one of its identities was the Railway Labor Science Research Institute (11963 – 1987). It is heir to accident research conducted there, but at the present, there are also the Safety Psychology Laboratory and the Ergonomics Laboratory, employing approximately 20 staffs (Ugajin, 1999).
I was conducting this research on RTRI because all the research regarding Japan Railway from RTRI. Related with my interesting about human error, there is Human Science Division in RTRI divided into 3 laboratories; Ergonomics laboratory, Psychology and Physiology Laboratory, and Safety Analysis Laboratory. Related with my research, the fact is Japan National railway had developed driver cabin to be ergonomics and comfort already done in 1970 – 1980 by Railway Labor Science Institute. Recently driver cabin already computerized. Its means Indonesia Railway was late 25 years from Japanese Railway.
Recent Researches of Human Science on Railway Systems
The recent researches of human science division on railway system at RTRI, there are 2 goals; to improve safety and to improve comfort. The main topic in Ergonomic laboratory is how to develop the facilities for disability person and elderly people. The research in Physiology Laboratory is endurance of work for driver related safety for analysis tolerance of fatigue. While, the research in the Psychology Laboratory is how to issue driver license test related with special attitude test, IQ test, and psychological test.
Prevention accidents caused by human errors
The most important challenge in the study of human science aiming at improvement of the safety level of railway systems is to prevent accidents caused by human error, especially those caused by the errors of railway employees, such as train drivers.
Maintenance and improvement of reliability of individuals and groups
The first area of study to prevent accidents caused by human error is that of human related studies concerning:
• Selection and deployment of persons who are less prone to errors
One practical achievement of railway related research into human science is the operation aptitude test (Psychological aptitude test) implemented for the staff engaged in train operation, such as train drivers, which is required by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport.
The Psychological aptitude test consists of 4 tests: Uchida – Kraepelin Performance Test, Intelligence Tests, Choice Reaction Test, and Attention Distribution Test. The Uchida-Kraepelin Performance Test has content about job performance. The Intelligence Test has content about reasoning ability. The Choice reaction test has content about reaction speed and accuracy. The last, attention distribution test has content about attention span.
• Training staffs who have the ability and attitude needed to avoid errors
The rapid aging of the society and the fall in the size of the younger population will make it necessary to positively use elderly and female employees. Number of older employees will increase in the future, focused on physical fitness as a required factor for drivers and other workers who worked irregular hours so that they could maintain a high safety level.
The Index of Physical fitness (IPC) proposed as one of strong indexes for control of health and physical conditions for accident prevention. The decline of arousal level from midnight to early morning of high score IPC subjects was smaller than low score IPC subjects (Satou et al., 2002). The targets of that training are to identify the requirements and minimum level of physical and mental abilities, health and physical conditions needed for the safe performance of tasks. It is essential to determine how to assess a person’s ability to continue work and what to do in terms of work conditions and environment.
• Maintenance and administration of staffs
Human Science conducted an opinion poll among railway employees to identify their safety awareness. Individual perceptions of safety are affected by the organization socio-psychological aspects, such as the attitude and policy toward safety and communication methods within the organization.
They also developed a method of assessing the safety awareness level of an organization as objectively and quantitatively as possible, by using the approach for hierarchical decision-making process (AHP)
Assessment and improvement of work environment
The second key to the prevention of human error induced accidents is the studies for assessing and improving the actual work environment and conditions that contribute to error reduction. Lately, numbers of studies have been done to assess and improve the work environment where train speeds are higher, traffic is denser and one man operation is introduced. It was found that one man drivers suffer from substantial mental stress in the event of problems or accidents and that this effect persists.
As indexes to show the adequacy of work conditions and environment, Human Science develops tools to estimate the workload. There are physiological indexes such as heart beat and the flickering and psychological indexes using recognizes symptoms test. One of the results on such studies, they have developed a prototype “driver’s workload questionnaire”, that consisting of six sets of criteria to easily and accurately measure and judge the effect of long working hours within the actual situations.
Accident analysis and safety management
Human science division collected data with the use of human error-induced accident investigation card, which consisted of a checklist of 65 items. Using this data, they built a human error induced accident database, which useful both for the interpretation of individual accidents and for statistic analysis. They are planning to develop a system that performs rapid and detailed cause analysis of an accident and suggests proper measures to be taken.
Measures to prevent accidents at crossing
Although number of accident at crossing is decreasing, preventive measures for this kind of accident is one of the most critical challenges in the field of human science because of the still quite high accident count, as well as the seriousness of the result. Recent work includes the designing of a new model of crossing signs with improved visibility and examination and proposal of visibility measuring methodology that can be applied easily to crossing.
Measures to minimize causalities in the event of an accident
Human Science Division was conducting research not only focus to the workers but also to the passengers. To minimize causalities in the event of an accident, Human Science have been accumulating data by listening to passengers who had experience an accident, performing experiments on the behavior of standing humans at the time of a low – speed collision, and collision tests using dummies with a newly develop collision experiments devices. Using this data, they have revised the simulation system that usually used in the automobile industry.
This system has been used to predict the movement and injuries of passengers under several simple conditions, such as standing, sitting on a cross seat, or sitting on a long seat. They are trying to identify the points at which the safety level of cabin equipment could be upgraded, or to measures quantitatively the effectiveness of safety posture.
The accident of long seat type commuter train and clarified the feature of passenger injuries at accidents that the chest injuries are outstanding with seated passengers (48%) and injuries on the head are with standing passengers (20%). 64% of the injuries taking place to seated passengers are caused by the hand rails and 80% of those to standing passengers are by the floor, columns, and other passengers (Omino, 2003).
Improvement of riding comfort and railway facilities
The main areas of recent research into the improvement of railway riding comfort focus on in cabin comfort such as jolts or vibration reduction. On the other hand, with the imminent graying of the society, research into making railway facilities and equipment safe and easy to use for the elderly and the handicapped is starting a new.
Due to the increased speed of trains, attention must be paid to the comfort level, as well as to the safety level. They decided three research targets for the immediate future. There are: (1) quantitatively measuring the effect of multiple vibration characteristics, (2) establishing a method for assessing the comfort level so that it can be used to determine the optimal pendulum control pattern of pendulum trains, and (3) establishing a method for assessing the comfort level, which considers the time frequency of exposure to vibration.
Trains have been regarded as one of the modes of transportation that are least likely to cause motion sickness. However, after the introduction of tilting cars for speed up trains on conventional lines, motion sickness has become more common. They conducted research wit the purpose is to identify the stimuli causing motion sickness, create a create guideline for assessment using physical measurements and reflect them in the control methods.
In a broader sense, the on board comfort level is determined not only vibration in the car but also by the seats, noise, or visual factor such as design and lighting. The latter refers to the uncomfortable phenomenon in which passengers experience ear pain when a train goes to the tunnel. Trains on shinkansen lines are airtight and air conditioned so that there is no pressure change in the cabin, but in trains on conventional lines, more passengers are experiencing this phenomenon with the increased speed.
Beside that, Human Science tries to improve of railway facilities for the elderly and the disabled person. They develop a warning block for visual disabled persons and a guidance system for the sight-impaired passenger. ( Shinomiya, 2002)
Signal Aspect and Signal Legibility
It was same as in Indonesia Railway. The signal should be visible, at least could be recognized from the distance of 600 m and fitness from the train driver. In Indonesia Railway, the signal only consisting 3 colors, there are red, yellow, and green. While in Japanese Railway, the signal consisting at least 5 colors, there are:
Table 2. The signaling aspect in Japanese Railway
Name Aspect Directed speed
Proceed signal
Reduced speed signal
Caution signal
Restricted speed signal
Stop signal Green (G)
Yellow and Green (YG)
Yellow (Y)
Two Yellow (YY)
Red (R) 130 km/h
75 km/h
45 km/h
25 km/h
0 km/h
The maximal speed for local train is 130 km/h because there are still many crossing. The distance between one of signal to the next signal is 600 m. Its mean all of train will start to pull the brake at 600 m before stop. The new aspect is the signal aspect with two green lights (speed-up signal or GG) and located on the higher level side of proceed signal. This is a clear signal to allow the train which can be operated at 130 km/h or higher to proceed at the allowable maximum speed. In this case, the G signal functions as a restricted proceed signal to allow the train to proceed at 130 km/h or less (Shiroto, 1999).
Protective Device
In Japan Railway, there are some protective devices which not develop in Indonesia Railway. There are:
• Block System
• Train Control Systems
• Train Traffic Control Systems
• Wireless Communications Devices
• Earthquake detection and alarm system (UREDAS)
An automatic block system uses the track circuit to automatically detect train in blocks and to control the signals for each block. Block is from one signal to another signal. All double tracked sections in Japan use this system. In addition to the automatic block system, a number of other block systems are used on single tracks. A track circuit system or an electronic block system is used; both are semi automatic block system. The track circuit system controls train movement in the blocks between stations and involves interlocking signal levers at the two station that a train traveling between it. The train’s departure and arrival are detected by the track circuits at the station entrance and exit. In the electronic block system, each train has a radio communications device that transmits the train’s ID.
As an effective countermeasure against collisions, most of modern railway systems employ a static block system, in which signals prevent more than one train from entering any particular section of track. The new satellite train control system adopts a moving block approach which allows much closer distances between trains without compromising safety. Data regarding the position, speed, and other details of moving trains are transmitted by satellite to an earth station, which then distributes relevant data via the satellite to each train (Haga, 1992).
The driver must always obey the signal, but the possibility of human error can cause serious accidents. Two rail accident with serious loss of life in the early 1960 resulted in the installation of the so-called Automatic Train Stop (ATS) system throughout Japan. In the ATS system, an alarm sounds in the cab when the train approaches a stop signal, warning the driver to stop. If he fails to apply the brakes, the ATS stops the train automatically. The ATS system uses ground coils installed on the track some distance before signals. If a train passes a coil when the signal aspect is stop, an alarm is sent immediately to the driver, regardless of the train speed. If the driver does not stop within 5 seconds after alarm is received, the emergency brakes are applied automatically to stops the train.
Automatic Train Control (ATC) system was developed for high speed trains like the shinkansen, which travel so fast that the driver has almost no time to acknowledge trackside signal. ATC system applies the brakes automatically when the train speed exceeds the speed limit and will be released as soon as the train slows below the speed limit. However, ATC system has three disadvantages:
1. The headway cannot reduced due to the idle running time between releasing the brakes at one speed limit and applying the brakes at the next slower speed limit
2. The brakes are applied when the train achieves maximum speed, meaning reduced ride comfort
3. If the operator wants to run faster train on the line, all the related relevant wayside and on board equipment must be changed first
The digital ATC system uses the track circuits to detect the presence of a train in the section and then transmits digital data from wayside equipment to the train on the track circuit numbers, the number of clear sections (track circuits) to the next train ahead, and the platform that the train will arrive. The digital ATC system has a number of advantages:
1. Use of one-step brake control permits high density operations because there is no idle running time due to operation delay between brake releases at the intermediate speed limit stage
2. Trains can run at the optimum speed with no need to start early deceleration because braking pattern can be created for any type of rolling stock based on data from wayside equipment indicating the distance to the next train a head. This makes mixed operation of express, local, and freight trains on the same track possible at the optimum speed
3. There is no need to change the wayside ATC equipment when running faster train in the future
Computer and Radio Aided Train (CARAT) is being developed to reduce the equipment amount and permit on-board detection of train locations without using track circuits. This system will control train traffic by transmitting information between the ground and trains. CARAT will also be able to obtain accurate information on train locations, and transmission of information from the trains to the wayside equipment will make it possible to create moving blocks.
Advanced Train Administration and Communications System (ATACS) uses radio telecommunications, to verify that the system is safe for track maintenance personnel.
Train Traffic Control requires full and continuous knowledge of the train operations. In a conventional traffic control system, station use telephone communications to establish a route, but this process is too slow and inefficient for modern rail traffic volumes. Centralized Traffic Control (CTC) provides the traffic control centre with information on the situation of all track sections and permits the centre to control train routes directly. The heart of the centre is a number of centralized display and control panels, connected to stations and train by various types of equipments: radio equipment, command telephones, train schedule recorders, train number display unit, etc. This already computerized using Programmed Route Control (PRC) system.
The Shinkansen Computer aided Traffic Control System (COMTRAC) has a number of advanced function, including route control, traffic coordination, rolling stock management, and passenger information service. JR East improved the COMTRAC system in 1998 when it opened the Hokuriku Shinkansen. This system is called Computerized Safety Maintenance and Operation Systems for Shinkansen (COSMOS) and integrates existing COMTRAC function with traffic planning, traffic administration, maintenance equipment control, and rolling stock control.
The Autonomous decentralized Transport Operation System (ATOS), a new and very powerful traffic control system is being implemented for the Tokyo region to control 17 track section, 390 stations, and 6200 daily train operations. The system first entered service in 1996 on JR East’s Chuo Line. ATOS and COSMOS are very similar; ATOS began first, but efforts were focused on COSMOS as the shinkansen control system.
Before the introduction of train radio, a crew member would have to use a trackside railway telephone to call the control centre if an accident occurred outside a station. Today, the train crew can communicate immediately with the control centre using the train radio. There are narrow-gauge train radio communications and Shinkansen radio communications. Railways use duplex, semi-duplex, and simplex radio telecommunications for non-shinkansen line. Duplex is used on section with heavy traffic, semi duplex is used on high-priority sections with less dense traffic, and simplex is used on other track sections. Shinkansen radio communications supported by leaky coaxial (LCX) cables were laid first along the full length of both the Tohoku Shinkansen and Joetsu Shinkansen to transmit data and messages to and from command and track telephones, and on-board public telephone. The supported LCX cable is run along the noise control barrier beside the track, with suitable size slots cut into the cable to allow the signal to leak out. ( Takashige, 2005)
The RTRI has developed an urgent earthquake detection and alarm system (UREDAS) mainly for Shinkansen and put it into practical use. It was new method to predict seismic source parameters. This method operated based on the P-wave by utilizing the latest knowledge in seismology and other scientific field. UREDAS also can estimate the magnitude and the distance to the epicenter from the maximum amplitude and the amplitude increasing rate of the initial P-wave. RTRI has developed a seismograph for the new system by applying the new method to detect seismic source parameters. A built-in PC, makes the seismograph compact, light weight and enable parallel processing with remote operation in a real time. This makes it possible to use the seismograph at observations point in wayside substations. The Japan Meteorological Agency (JMA) has a plan to measure the seismic waves near the epicenter at 180 observation points across the country and distributed the information on the epicenter, magnitude, main shock arrival time and predicted seismic intensity, which is called now-cast earthquake information, before the main shock arrives. The now-cast information will be distributed when the P-wave has arrived at the observation point nearest the epicenter and repeatedly thereafter at certain time intervals. (Ashiya, 2002)
Magnetically-Levitated transport system (Maglev, linear motor cars)
The superconducting magnetically-levitated transport system (Maglev, linear motor cars) has come into the limelight as a next generation high speed and low noise transport system. Based on the results of research and development on the Miyazaki Maglev Test Track, the system is now subject to vehicle running tests on the Yamanashi Maglev Test Line. The system has been evaluated as “technologically feasible” by the committee for the evaluation of practical technologies of Maglev, Ministry of Transport, and is now in long term durability performance verification tests.
The results of Yamanashi Maglev Test Line are:
– Dec, 1997: Recorded the world’s highest unmanned running speed (550km/h)
– April, 1999: Recorded the world’s highest manned running speed (552 km/h)
– Dec, 2003: New Word Record speed of 581 km/h for a manned train
– Implemented tests of two trains passing each other at a relative speed of 1.003 km/h, each train composed of 3 cars.
VI. THE DISCUSSION
The comparison between the Indonesia Railway and the Japanese Railway
Based on the theory, there are 3 factors that cause an accident: unsafe condition, unsafe act, and unpredictable cause (as example disaster, earthquake, flood, etc). The biggest proportion comes from unsafe act (85%), after that unsafe condition (13%), and then unpredictable cause. The prevention program has hierarchy of controls, there are engineering control, administrative control, and personal control.
The engineering control is a control that is applied to the problem resource, for examples are enclosure, substitution, etc. Administrative control is a control that is applied when controlling in engineering is insufficient. It would be to manage time and to make farther distance between the worker and the source of hazard. Personal control is the last control when the previous control has been ineffective. This control usually gives Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), training, or education to increase the awareness of occupational health and safety among the workers.
Some basics differentiation between Indonesia Railway and Japanese Railway are:
• Unsafe condition is still the main reason in railways accident in Indonesia, therefore preventive action is still focused on improvement of equipments and facilities. Meanwhile, Japan Railway is no longer facing unsafe condition problem. The problem has been left for 25 years. Many research and technology development have been done to solve these problems in Japan. Nowadays, Japanese scientists are researching about unsafe act done by driver and eliminating the risk comes from unpredictable condition.
• Another differentiation is that all Japanese Railway have double track while Indonesia Railway don’t have completely.
• Japanese Railways purvey their train with protective safety devices while Indonesia Railway don’t.
• Japanese Railways have electric train with engine in every car while Indonesia Railway still are using diesel locomotive, especially for inter city. Electric train is only used in the inside city area with the engine only available on the front car.
For what we have learned from Japanese Railway, certainly there are some good inputs for Indonesia Railway. If we want to make a bench marking with Japanese Railway as a whole, it is still impossible because we still have a lot of things left behind from the Japanese Railway. One of them is Indonesian government policy. Indonesian government policy doesn’t treat railway as a public transportation. On the contrary, Indonesian government prefers to build highway but the quantity and the quality of cars that operated are not controlled. Besides that, consumptive behavior of Indonesian people increases the number of cars on the street year by year. Poorly, this situation is getting worse by no restriction for old car to operate.
However, there are some results that we could take as a reasonable implementation in the near future. First, facility improvement for the driver cabs. Many equipments and tools do not work properly. Second is the improvement of the signal facility. There are some signals that don’t function anymore, especially the yellow signal. Considering of high number of accidents, protective devices need to be applied in Indonesia Railway. The kind of protective devices, which could be applied immediately, are ATS and ATC on each block. Furthermore, it is important to develop Centralized Traffic Control (CTC).
CTS provide the traffic control centre with information on the situation of all track sections and permit the centre to control train routes directly. The heart of the centre is a number of centralized display and control panels, connected to stations and train by various types of equipments: radio equipment, command telephones, train schedule recorders, train number display unit, etc. This equipment is use for immediate communication between train and station to get or give information about train condition and passed track.
It is also important to develop an organization which can research center about train and its whole area, just like RTRI in Japan. RTRI in Japanese Railway becomes truly effective since many things could be done and invented to reach high performance in safety among Japanese Railway.
Previously, the organization of Indonesian Railway is under The Directorate General of Land Transportation. But since July 2005, Ministry of Transportation has developed The Directorate General of Train which consists of 3 directorates: Directorate of Traffic, Directorate Technique of Facilities, and Directorate of Safety. Unfortunately, the job descriptions for each directorate are not presented. There are still under development.
The management system in The Japan Railway is so strictly. For example, if the drivers delayed even only 1minutes or miss the sign for the door of cars, there is punishment or penalties such as: scores, cut of salary, or have to follow training again.
There was a case that took placed few months ago, a family with 4 years son and a little baby; the father is a train driver. One day, the wife and the children planned to go by train, unpredictly the train was driving by the father of the family. So that, the 4 years son pursuing to come into the driver’s cab, the mother has warning the son but she cannot hold it out anymore when the son hit the door frequently and cry hard enough. Even though the rules cannot allow this, the father give up and give permission to his son to come into his cabin and accompanying him for just around 3 minutes until the next station open the cabin’s door.. Poorly, train management know that the father broke the rule, so the father was punished by fired him from the job with the reason of allowing somebody-even the child-to go inside the driver’s cab. The management stated this would have to danger not only for the child but also for the whole passengers.
The rules state that nobody allowed going inside the driver’s cab except the driver and the co-driver. The driver’s cab is a narrow room, if there is any body else except the driver, it could disturb the concentration of the driver and the movements of the driver. To driving the train is not difficult, sometime could make the driver getting bored as the monotonous operating procedures, but the driver still need and strive for full concentrate driving.
In my opinion, system safety management has to be applied strictly. Due to the safety is first priority without compromised, no break time at all. In order to the Japan Railway applied the safety management system strongly.
However, the Japan Railway has to revise the application of safety management also about the understanding of the worker for the safety management. If the workers know deeply about the importance of the safety, so they will agree with the application of safety management system tightly. Do not let the worker think that the safety system just give them another responsibility, or just another rule that can be broken. We have to keep the psychology of the worker not pressured by the system in order to avoid fault and accident.
As for Indonesian Railway, the situation wills upside down if comparing with The Japan Railway. There is not safety management system applicable. Safety only means replacement of the broke supplies and maintenance. The case likes train that come late or somebody come inside the driver’s cab is considered proper situation and there is no action to improve it.
Actually, there is a rule to not allowing somebody except driver go inside the driver’s cab, but the drivers break it for a tips and extra money from the passenger who inside to their cabin. The Indonesian Railway has to complete safety management system regarding to considering urgent as the frequently accidents. They should improve the basic and applied rule in order to make good safety for the whole passengers and workers and make it the first priority right now.
Besides that, The Indonesia Railway should increase the incentive and wellbeing among the drivers. This is a major issue in Indonesia Railway. The driver will work with high motivation if they feel secure not only about the condition in driver cabs but also about their income.
Even though, Japanese Railway has been facilitated by high standard of safety, this doesn’t mean zero accident could happen. The awareness of drivers has been weakened by high standard of protective devices. They think if they do something wrong, the protective devices will take control. That’s the reason, nowadays Japanese Railway make a good selection system to choose the driver and has a minimum standard of requirement for both physically and mentally to become a train driver. It is also needed to build a system that could analyze both conditions physical and mental of the drivers, in order to keep their readiness and concentration.
In addition, The Japanese Railway has to control and maintain the protective devices, signal, and other facilities, since applying sophisticated protective devices will not use properly if there is lack of maintenance. The good and routine maintenance are the key to secure the function of every protective device and other facilities.
VII. CONCLUSION
1. Safety risk on driver workstation of The Indonesian Railway is about unsafe condition. Some of equipments and tools do not work properly.
2. The Japanese Railway had developed driver cabin to be safe, ergonomics and comfort already done in 1970 – 1980. Recently, the researches focus on endurance of work for driver related safety for analysis tolerance of fatigue and how to develop the facilities for disability person and elderly people. They also make a good selection system to choose the driver and has a minimum standard of requirement for both physically and mentally to become a train driver.
3. The Indonesian Railway has been left for 25 years by The Japanese Railway, especially related with the ergonomics improvement in the driver cabs.
4. The new directorate general which responsible of train is looking forward to capturing good implementation of The Indonesian Railway.
5. The safety management system in The Japan Railway is so strictly. The other hand, The Indonesian Railway has not safety management system.
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